The Extractive Industries Transparency Initiative (EITI): The latest attempt at governing the extractive industries in Chad

The Extractive Industries Transparency Initiative (EITI): The latest attempt at governing the extractive industries in Chad

The Extractive Industries and Society 4 (2017) 825–832 Contents lists available at ScienceDirect The Extractive Industries and Society journal homep...

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The Extractive Industries and Society 4 (2017) 825–832

Contents lists available at ScienceDirect

The Extractive Industries and Society journal homepage: www.elsevier.com/locate/exis

Original article

The Extractive Industries Transparency Initiative (EITI): The latest attempt at governing the extractive industries in Chad

T



Remadji Hoinathya, , Babett Jánszkyb a b

Centre de Recherche en Anthropologie et Sciences Humaines (CRASH), Po Box: 6542, N'Djamena, Chad Martin-Luther-Universität Halle-Wittenberg, Institut für Ethnologie und Philosophie, 06099 Halle, Germany

A R T I C L E I N F O

A B S T R A C T

Keywords: Extractive Industries Transparency Initiative (EITI) Chad Oil revenues Transparency Civil society Governance

For over a decade, Chad has embraced the Extractive Industries Transparency Initiative (EITI), one of the most widely-adopted interventions aimed at improving knowledge of revenue distribution in the mining and oil and gas sectors worldwide. In Chad, the EITI provides a foundation for dialogue between various stakeholders and has thus become an important entry point for examining the social and economic impacts of oil in the country. This paper provides an extended analysis of the EITI experience in the country, focusing specifically on how it has influenced the governance of oil revenue, the role played by civil society organisations in this area, and the responses of the government to the intervention.

1. Introduction Chad has featured regularly in reports on the latest crises in central and northwestern Africa. The location of significant internal violent conflict, drawn out over the breakdown of Libya and the separation of the two Sudans, Chad has become a strategic partner for Western leaders and coalitions in the fight against terrorism in the countries which it borders. One reason for this may be Chad’s financial liquidity, brought about by a decade of oil revenues that allow the government to invest heavily in political infrastructure and military support for the benefit of its struggling neighbour states. These oil revenues, however, have failed to improve the lives of the country’s citizenry, catalyse improved access to infrastructure and create economic opportunities, manifestations of a resource curse have been widely discussed (Behrends, 2008; Frank and Guesnet 2010; Hoinathy, 2013a,b; Scott 2009). Little is known about the internal political effects of Chadian oil exploitation, particularly in relation to the emergence and political empowerment of civil society groups (CSGs), which mobilised en masse in an effort to prevent a resource curse-type scenario from surfacing. This mobilisation legitimised the role of civil society in the management of an oil governance model introduced by the World Bank. More importantly, this mobilisation has also helped to establish civil society as a key cog of the Extractive Industries Transparency Initiative (EITI) in Chad. This paper explains



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how, drawing upon findings from research conducted among Chadian civil society organisational networks and their international political partners. The EITI is a policy framework which emerged in response to the resource curse, a phenomenon first popularised by Auty (1993). Since the author’s coining of the concept, it has been widely-debated by scientists, politicians and media worldwide. Several subsequent studies (e.g. Mross 2012; Karl, 1997; Behrends et al., 2011) have highlighted the paradoxical connection between resource abundance on the one hand, and the deterioration of populations, mapping economic stagnation, the breakdown of social systems and the outbreak of conflicts related to power and resource access in affected states on the other hand. Statisticians and economists have been criticised for making sweeping generalisations about the resource curse based on quantitative data such as GDP. In response, research has increasingly incorporated other criteria, including the quality of institutions in host countries and political ‘infrastructure’. In petro-states, researchers have focused on stakeholder entanglements, governance and processes of social change, as well as analysed socio-political ruptures (e.g. Appel et al., 2015).1 Increasingly, Chad and neighbouring states, the ‘newcomers’ to oil production in sub-Saharan Africa, have featured in the literature on the resource curse. These studies cover subjects such as social changes (Behrends and Hoinathy, 2017; Hoinathy, 2013a,b), relations and ambiguities between Chinese and African oil economies

Corresponding author. E-mail addresses: [email protected] (R. Hoinathy), [email protected] (B. Jánszky). For further reading, see Behrends et al. (2011).

https://doi.org/10.1016/j.exis.2017.11.004 Received 9 September 2016; Received in revised form 8 November 2017; Accepted 8 November 2017 Available online 15 November 2017 2214-790X/ © 2017 Elsevier Ltd. All rights reserved.

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implemented in Chad, it is instructive to explore briefly the issue of ‘translation’. Efforts to globalise ethical standards, through international codes, policy frameworks and practices such as the UN Global Compact, begs the question: how can principles and norms emphasising improved responsibility and equity be transferred from one nation, place or group of actors to another? The transfer of knowledge and ideas between societies has been debated heavily in the social sciences. We contribute to this debate by examining the efficacy of travelling models, tracing and explaining how global ideas such as good governance, and more precisely, the idea of transparency as a means to good governance, are being translated from one location to another, in this case from the international level to Chad. Translation is understood here as the continuous movement of an idea or a conception of reality from one spatial and/or temporal context to another. It is a process of disseminating cultural forms, such as neo-liberal modes of governance, religious beliefs or discourses (Behrends et al., 2014). Our research examines the work and involvement of CSGs as agents that controls—and translate the ideas underpinning the agendas of—institutions in the context of resource-related governance. In the language of ‘travelling models’, measures developed to change social practices in the field of anti-corruption campaigning in the oil sector can be viewed as ‘social technologies’ related to production and revenue distribution. These ‘technologies’ put into practice travelling models, thereby spawning new social and political dynamics at different levels. Focusing on locally-based CSGs, we have been able to trace in how actors use the ‘Alternative Governance Initiative’ (AGI) to further their own agendas and legitimise their groups’ claims. Focusing on local dynamics around the terms of the AGI, our paper scrutinises the creativity and practice of local actors and the way they use models to create new social and political roles for themselves and others. This approach also reinforces the position of Mosse (2005) and Merry (2006), who maintain that NGO workers ‘map the middle’ as local- and nationallevel intermediaries and translators of global ideas or travelling models. They frame local needs and problems according to the stated aims of international agencies (Neubert, 1996). As such, they are social engineers or ‘entrepreneurs’ whose actions in the public sphere, which, in the case of the oil debate in Chad, create ‘socio-political re-composition processes’ (Le Meur, 1996: 5) that deserve close attention (see also Bierschenk et al., 2000). We also take a step back, evaluating briefly the European-based institutional contexts which gave rise to the ideas underpinning the global transparency agenda in a bid to understand the impetus behind the EITI framework and how it has been adapted for use in other geographical locations.

(Magrin, 2013; Schritt, 2016a,b), the looting and securing of oil and oil production facilities, and the politics of naming, blaming and claiming in oil conflict settings.2 The main theme underpinning all of this work, however, is governance. The term ‘governance’ is, of course, not of unanimity in the social sciences; it covers various meanings. Out of this plurality, a regular reference is made to Michel Foucault’s concept of governmentality (Foucault, 1994). It represents a set of techniques and knowledge deployed by the state to organise society and individuals to render them governable or manageable. The result is then the disposition of people and things rendered ‘right’ through technical organisation, knowledge and security apparatus deployment. Our perspective in this article diverts from this approach, drawing attention to social dynamics and centring more on actor networks, logic and interaction than on rules and formal rhetoric. Major players in international development, such as the World Bank, have their own conceptualisations of governance. For the World Bank, governance is ‘the way power is exercised in a country to manage its national economic and social resources for development’ (World Bank, 1992). This carries normative assumptions that underpins the World Bank’s actions towards the advent of ‘governance’ deemed ‘good’ or ‘better’ than what the Bank’s analysts perceive as running in developing countries. This observation concurs with Hufty (2007), who argued that ‘At the World Bank, governance has become more of a political tool to transform societies than an analytical approach. Its usage refers to what “should be” and not what “is”’ (p. 1). Such an interpretation, however, becomes problematic when it comes to anthropological analysis of the issue of governance because it carries an obvious bias. Another ‘trend’ has been is to use the concept as an analytical variable to capture the discourses and practices of ‘governance’, as deployed in the South by aid agencies.3 We follow the proposition put forward by Olivier de Sardan (2009) and envisage governance in a descriptive, analytical and empirical perspective: ‘as any organized form of goods’ distribution and public or collective services delivery, following specific standards and logics’. This perspective deflects from the former approaches’ normative orientation and allows for a casting of a critical eye on the diversity of modes of governance that may exist or coexist, in recognition that ‘each organized form of this delivery or each institutional arrangement, operate according to specific norms, and implements specific logics’ (Olivier de Sardan, 2009: 6). In relation to oil, we will subsume this set of management mechanisms, institutions and rules under the label ‘oil revenues’ modes of governance’. Worldwide notions and claims related to the idea of ‘good governance’ have been driven and accelerated by global political and social ‘trends’, enhanced by the effects of globalisation in the 20th century. In an attempt to operationalise this view, debates and discussion platforms, guidelines and norms addressing questions of equity and social responsibility have been formulated, many of which involve the participation of an ultimately target the private sector. A case in point is the UN-Global Compact, established in 1999 jointly by the United Nations and industry. By subscribing—and displaying their membership—to the UN-Global Compact, enterprises commit to upholding human rights and labour rights, as well as protecting the environment. In 2004, a 10th principle was added to the manifesto covering the fight against corruption in a bid to draw attention to how it poses a major obstacle to achieving sustainable development.4The focus of this paper is on the EITI, one major initiative that has emerged in the spirit of this 10thprinciple. Before exploring at greater length how this initiative has been

2. The World Bank and oil production in Chad Under the direction of the World Bank, a specific strategy for governing oil revenues was installed in Chad about a decade ago. The organisation’s actions in developing countries are premised upon the view that to alleviate poverty, ‘good governance’ and robust public institutions are needed. In Chad, one of the poorest countries in the world, oil production was expected to catalyse investment in public and basic social services, therefore facilitating development (Hoinathy, 2013a,b). Committed to its principles, namely that governance is ‘the way power is exercised in a country to manage its national economic and social resources for development’ (World Bank, 1992), the Bank insisted that there was transparency and participation throughout the development phase. Moreover, the Bank required the deployment of certain legal and institutional reforms as a guarantee to ensure ‘good governance’ of oil resources in the country. At the heart of this mechanism is Law 001/ PR/99, implemented on 11 January 1999, specifically to facilitate effective oil revenue management. According to this law, 10% of revenues are to be deposited into an offshore escrow account at Citibank in London for future generations and 90% is to be paid into the Chadian

2 For further reading, see publications of the DFG-funded project Oil and Social Change in Niger and Chad» on http://www.spp1448.de/projects/oil-and-social-change/ (Accessed 20 November 2015). 3 See Bierschenk and de Sardan (2014). 4 For further information, see www.globalcompact.org.

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treasury. Of this 90%, 80% is allocated to the so-called priority sectors,5 15% used to assist the State and 5% is supposed to be sent back to the to the producing region (Hoinathy, 2013a,b).6 This law also established a mixed Board of Control and Supervision of Oil Resources (CCSRP), an independent institution that seeks to verify compliance with the budget, and to control and authorise the allocation and disbursement of funds. Despite the reluctance of the Chadian Government, an opening was made to non-state actors in oil revenue management by creating seats for their representatives on the board. The full impact of CSG representatives on the CCSRP is open to debate, but their presence on the board already constitutes a shift in the usual approach to public affairs management in the country. Alongside the aforementioned development, a number of non-state actors brought together as networks were created in the wake of the Chad–Cameroon oil project. With the technical, financial and political backing of European and American partners (i.e. Misereor, Brot für Die Welt, Catholic Relief Service, CORDAID), they advocated for oil extraction that respects local communities’ dignity, rights and environment.7 On the field, Chad complies at first as much as possible with the requirements agreed upon with the World Bank and translated in the law. This was a prerequisite for the project to begin. Once the project was launched and royalties started to flow, the Chadian Government, owing to its new financial capabilities, changed its attitude. Only five years after the project began (in 2006), the Chadian Government would revise Law 001/PR/99: the Future Generations Fund was cancelled; the quota allocated to the functioning of the State increased from 15% to 30%; and priority sectors extended to energy and oil, justice, security and territorial administration. In response, the World Bank withdrew from the project officially on 9 September 2009 and justified its move on the grounds that the Chadian Government failed to fulfil its commitment to use oil revenue for poverty alleviation purposes. Chad reimbursed all World Bank loans. The World Bank, however, maintained its partnership with the country on other development issues. In fact, the World Bank is one of the main financial contributors to EITI-Chad.

withdrawal, the country completed its application for EITI candidacy. Things proceeded very quickly because the next week, a workshop was organised in the country capital N’Djamena to officially launch EITI in the country. This workshop represented one of the very concrete steps towards ‘translating’ the EITI in Chad. From that workshop, the translation went further through juridical and institutional development to comply with EITI principles and requirements. By the end of the same year, an EITI implementation mechanism was set through Presidential Decree 1074/PR/PM/MP/2007, adopted in December 2007. After an initial rejection for non-compliance with EITI’s requirements in 2008, Chad was accepted as a candidate country in April 2010. To date, seven conciliation reports have been published by the national committee with the assistance of Fair Lynks (an internationally recognised economic and financial firm),11 making Chad one of the countries to produce such a number of reports over such a short time period. On 23 May 2013, however, the EITI International Board declared Chad non-compliant. At that time, the country did not fulfil eight of 20 EITI requirements. Finally, the country achieved compliancy on 15 October 2014 during the 28th Meeting of EITI International Board in Myanmar. More than one year after becoming compliancy status was obtained, the 2013 report was published in February 2016. Chad will be validated again in October 2017. It is also important to mention that since achieving compliance, some major changes have taken place within the National EITI Committee. The executive coordinator has been changed twice (December 2014 and August 2015). The first appointment caused turmoil within the HCN, particularly by civil society representatives who questioned the new coordinator's abilities in relation to EITI issues. This also brings us back to the usual mode of appointment in the country: not absolutely based on the appointees’ competence. 4. Key stakeholders in Chad’s EITI The EITI has been implemented in Chad in accordance with its principles at the international level. Here, we focus on the different stakeholders and their positioning within EITI implementation mechanism in Chad. The presidential decree 250/PR/PM/MEP/2010 appointed the 28 members of the High National Committee for EITI Implementation and Monitoring, promulgated on 15 February 2010 and Decree 251/PR/PM/MPE/2010, which appointed the 10 members of the EITI Pilot Committee promulgated on the same date. Representatives from government, industry and the CSO committee are visible within each of these organs. The composition of EITI organs also changed in 2014 to reduce the members and render the functioning lighter and more efficient.

3. Oil and the EITI in Chad The EITI is a coalition of mainly governments, oil companies, investors and CSGs. Its board is comprised of members from governments, companies and civil society appointed at the bi-annual EITI Global Conference.8 Based in London, the coalition publishes reports that disclose the amounts of money flowing between extractive companies and governments, in a bid to improve openness and transparent management of revenues from natural resources.9 Approximately 52 countries are implementing EITI norms and 31 are compliant with these norms. More than 22 African countries are part of the global network.10 The EITI could be considered a new approach to natural resource revenue management because it proposes that the state alone should not be entrusted to manage finances alone but other stakeholders, in particular members from civil society, be involved. The idea here is that, in line with Fisher (1997), ‘the growth of robust civil society’ (p. 444) supported by active, educated and informed citizens that could claim more accountability from their states (Junge, 2012: 411–412), could bring more transparency and better governance. In 2004, the Chadian presidency informed the World Bank about its intention to adhere to the EITI. On 20 August 2007, eight years after launching its oil project and one year after the World Bank’s

4.1. Civil society organisations: the pioneers Before coming to these actors, let us unpack first what civil society may be in reality in Chad. Following the arrival of a democratic regime in 1990, thousands of non-state organisations and associations emerged in the country. These essentially not-for-profit organisations are set up to stand for common ideals, interests and rights; to pressure the state to improve living conditions; and to protect the environment. The profile of organisations subsumed under the appellation ‘civil society’ is as controversial as it is large. In a recent cartography of civil society organisations, Amar et al. (2014) asserted that ‘civil society also includes farmers' associations, professional associations, community organizations, environmental advocacy groups, independent research institutes, universities, faith-based organizations, labour unions, and non-profit media and other groups that are not [directly] involved in development activities12; (p. 15). In our opinion, this definition resonates quite well

5 Health, social affairs, education, infrastructure, rural development, and environment and water resources. 6 Logone Oriental in southern Chad. 7 See Petry and Bambé (2005) for more details. 8 https://eiti.org/about/board. 9 See Mross (2012) for more details. 10 https://eiti.org/countries.

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See http://www.fair-links.com/en/. This definition is a mainstreaming pop up by most development milieu and used as such by the EITI in its glossary. 12

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In Chad, an improved circulation of information about oil production was supposed to help stop corruption and malfeasance in the upstream flow of royalties. The disclosure of information was also intended to raise citizens’ consciousness about the amounts received by the state and how these monies are being used. The EITI was intended as a new room for more ‘dialogue and consultation’ between the public and the state on the use of oil revenue and producing companies. According to one CSG representative,‘ out of EITI, relationships between civil society and extractive companies were frontal because there was no room for claims and to legitimately expose problems’ (Miandadji 2014a: 25–26). This may be the official agenda CSGs are defending within the EITI process.

with the empirical reality of civil society in Chad. The debate on their roles, their relationships and their closeness with the government is complex. In Chad, these organisations are mostly devoted to achieving better governance of oil revenues (Hoinathy 2013: 64–67). With bodies for the EITI in place in Chad, the aforementioned decrees had the effect of promoting civil society organisations’ participation in the upstream management of oil funds, legitimised by the precedent set by Law N°001. By upstream management of petroleum resources, we mean the circuit going from the oil companies to the Chadian public treasury. Thus, within the National High Committee (HCN-EITI) and the Pilot Committee, CSG representatives have a legitimate place. Of the 28 members of the National High Committee (HCN – EITI), 10 are from civil society organisations (i.e. more than one third of the seats): two from Union des Syndicats du Tchad (UST),13two from Human Rights Associations,14 two from associations looking at gender and women’s rights,15 two from the Union des Journalistes du Tchad (UJT),16 and two from Patronat Tchadien.17 The representative from the Association pour la Promotion des Libertés Fondamentales au Tchad (APLFT)was appointed Deputy President of the National High Committee, seconding the Oil Minister (President). Of the 10 members of the Pilot Committee, there are two representatives from civil society organisations, specifically, one from the Commission Nationale Justice et Paix (President of the Pilot Committee)18 and one from Commission Permanente Pétrole Nationale.19 Following the recommendations of the 2012 EITI report and the principles related to the governance of EITI implementation bodies, the committees were overhauled. The pilot committee was disbanded, replaced, in August 2014, by a new organisational chart composed solely of members from the National High Committee, which is governed by Decree 874/PR/MPME/2014. This decree also reduced the number of National High Committee members from 28 to 25. The composition of civil society representation has, therefore, changed, dropping from 10 to eight. But the new decree also consecrated the post of Deputy President of the High Committee to civil society representatives. Their importance remains obvious. Let us now turn to the factors driving CSG participation in the EITI. As Petry and Bambé (2005) as well as Hoinathy (2013a, 2013b) explain, in the wake of oil exploitation in Chad, CSGs formed networks and established platforms, as well as launched new organisations. In addition to advocacy and activism aimed at facilitating good governance of the project, they have carried out, through different channels, activities aimed at raising awareness among local communities of the environmental and social impacts of oil production (Hoinathy, 2013:95). From November 2004, they engaged the national Publish What You Pay (PWYP) coalition, which focuses more clearly on ensuring transparency of the distribution of oil revenue. This network has been advocating both at the international and the local level for adherence to the EITI. These actors could, therefore, be considered pioneers in the ‘translation’ of the initiative in Chad. Their long history of, and long-term commitment to, activism gives them unrivalled expertise locally. This could very easily explain their rapid legitimacy in EITI bodies. Decree874/PR/MPME/2014 clearly designated ‘3 représentants des association oeuvrant dans le secteur extractif’, the fruits of their efforts within the EITI implementation process in the country. At the beginning of this process, the state refused to accept representatives from these organisations.

4.2. The state: in search of a bankable reputation Despite the World Bank’s dismissal of the Chadian oil project in 2008 on the grounds of the government’s reluctance to fulfil its commitments to fight poverty with oil revenues, the latter keeps paradoxically referring to the World Bank’s model as proof for its willingness to establish good governance. The World Bank’s engagement in the Chadian oil project has been richly documented. Most authors appreciate its novelty but have doubted its ability to function in the Chadian context; most would be proved correct (Keenan 2005; ColomJaén and Campos-Serrano, 2013; Reyna, 2007; Hoinathy, 2013a,b). The oil project has brought about a number of institutional and polity changes in the country. One has been the adoption of a National Strategy for Poverty Reduction and another for good governance. On August 2007, Chad’s candidacy to EITI declaration was made public by the head of the State himself. It would seem, therefore, that to the Chadian Government, applying to EITI is in line with the ‘National Strategy for Good Governance and Poverty Reduction’. The push to become EITI compliant also demonstrates ‘the Government’s willingness to ensure transparency in the upstream management of national resources’ and to ‘ensure the participation of all components of the nation in the formulation of major policy options in order to take the necessary actions to fight corruption’ (Miandadji 2014b:31).20The Minister of Oil and Energy is, as indicated, the President of the National High Committee and most of the departments and state institutions in charge of regulating and administering policies for the extractive industries in the country are represented. Each is appointed by their respective institutions but officially nominated. For the oil minister, the government has shown ‘a lot of political will’ in implementing EITI as this process integrates its previous actions in favour of good governance. According to the same minister, ratifying the United Nations Convention against corruption and adhering to the African Peer Review Mechanism21 (APRM) in January 2013 would suggest a willingness to ‘deal with governance in all its dimensions’ (Miandadji 2014b:16).22 Moreover, Chad is, to date, one of few African countries to build its own seat for EITI. Nonetheless, this official discourse should not be received without questioning its real scope or the other agenda it may carry considering the ruling elites’ antecedents in the management of their international and national commitments for development and the fight against corruption. This question also relies on the agenda itself, the importance of global initiatives and various policies circulating in the global space to developing countries’ reputation, especially those still dependent on international development aid like Chad. The decision to join the EITI stems from a desire on the part of the Government of Chad to maintain peace with its financial partners,

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The major labour union in the country. Namely from APLFT and Collectif des Associations de Défense des Droits de l’Homme (CADH). 15 One from Cellule d’Information et de Liaison des Association Féminines(CELIAF), a platform of Chadian gender-focused organizations and associations, and another from an Arabophone association. 16 Chadians Journalists Union. 17 Employers. 18 A catholic NGO. 19 A network of NGOs dedicated to social and environmental issues related to oil exploitation in Chad. 14

20 This was confirmed during an interview with the oil minister in N’Djamena, 26 December 2014. 21 See more under http://www.nepad.org/economicandcorporategovernance/africanpeer-review-mechanism/about. 22 This was confirmed during an interview with the oil minister in N’Djamena, 26 December 2014.

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5. The EITI: room for new compromises?

including the Bretton Woods Institutions and the European Union. As Klein (2012) put it, in the name of “good governance”, the IMF or the World Bank demand a better traceability of public decisions in countries that might receive international aid (p. 109). On the other hand, most of Chad’s financial partners are also contributing financially to the EITI implementation process in the country. Even if the country in 2006 was able to sever ties completely with the World Bank on the oil production front by paying back the total amount of credit contracted for the implementation of the Chad–Cameroon Pipeline, the partnership between the institution and the country continued in other domains (Hoinathy 2013: 67). Joining the EITI also suggestions a willingness on the part of Chad to reassure its partners of its capacity to govern transparently. Indeed, the establishment of transparency mechanisms and guarantees are now part of aid conditionality, and an important criterion in debt relief negotiations through the Heavily Indebted Poor Countries (HIPC) facility.23 Several agendas seem to be in competition here. Indeed, behind the official discourse of improving the upstream governance of oil resources, there is, above all, the desire to maintain international aid through compliance with the EITI principles. Moreover, the EITI's limited impact on day-to-day governance in Chad also raises questions about the official agenda.

After the World Bank’s rejection, the only institution in which nonstate actors had a voice in the debate on oil revenues management was the Control Board. In Chad, this represents a first shift in practices related to the state’s revenue management. Oil resources have always been a matter of national sovereignty, jealously guarded by the government without any serious informational disclosure about them. As we already mentioned, even the World Bank, whose support was key for catalysing implementation of the Chad-Cameroon Pipeline, has learned the hard way by insisting on Chad’s compliance with the provisions contained within Law 001 on oil revenue management. However, even the voices of the actors on this board have rarely been heard. In recent years, these actors have been put on the other side of the rubicund, conducting their own independent monitoring of the oil project, sensitising and organising communities and denouncing and/or advocating for respect of the project’s environmental and social clauses and a fair use of the revenues. As such, even if from time to time the government and the oil companies agree with civil society organisation representatives, concrete and fruitful dialogue could not really be established. The interactions between these different levels were always subject to tensions. Thus, the EITI represents a new framework for partnership between the CSG representatives, the government and oil companies on the issue of oil revenues, even if limited to upstream management. These organisations’ representatives occupy significant seats within the institutions, implementing EITI principles because of their expertise gained from long-term activism within another global initiative on the issue of transparency, namely the PWYP network and its advocacy for Chad’s candidacy to EITI. As shown before, the shift also includes a new kind of collaboration between the State and CSG representatives about oil governance, at least the upstream part of it. This new partnership also induces a change in the positioning of actors in the debate on oil and the management of the resources it generates (i.e. the controversy and heated debates over oil governance are lowering). As part of the EITI, this collaboration is necessary for a productive and beneficial implementation of the process. Furthermore, the high expectations of civil society actors on the EITI as a key or a tool to improve governance of the extractive industries could justify such a commitment. A partnership requires, in most cases, compromises. The question remains, however: to what extent or at which costs to make compromises without compromising oneself? In the field, we observed that there is less room for CSGs and their representatives to keep on using denunciation as the first strategy. An illustration of this situation is as follows: In 2014, before the International EITI Board made its decision on the conformity of Chad, the government again changed Law No. 001, increasing the quota directly dedicated to its functioning from 30% to 45% of oil revenues and reducing the percentage dedicated to priority sectors from 65% to 50%. This law is part of the gains obtained by CSGs’ advocacy from the beginning of the oil project. When, in 2006, the State modified this law to add to the priority sectors’ national security and remove the 10% dedicated to future generations, there was a strong mobilisation of CSGs. This is understandable as this law was the last guarantee of the usage of oil revenues for poverty alleviation by investing in priority sectors. However, the latter modification, which reduces the quota earmarked for these investments, almost went unnoticed. CSGs and their representatives are now too involved in the upstream management of oil revenues and seem to make the publication of information on the flow of petrodollars and its weight in the State budget their main battle horse. Indeed, most of the non-state actors involved in the implementation of EITI actions focus on the amounts of money paid and received, leaving aside downstream management and therefore the real use of these incomes. This is why we agree with Klein’s (2012) position that ‘the difficulty to carry technical discussions and the lack of politic space to bring grievances beyond EITI’s circle prevent civil society from playing an effective surveillance

4.3. Extractive industry companies: legitimacy and credibility Companies in the extractive industries‘ space’ are worldwide gnawed at by activists and human rights and environment defence organisations about the misdeeds of their activities. They are also commonly identified as corrupted governments’ accomplices in perpetuating rent-seeking behaviour, individual enrichment and poverty. Indeed, many oil and mining companies have been at the heart of highprofile corruption cases, including ELF in Congo Brazzaville, and Griffiths Energy International and the former Chadian Ambassador to the United States, Mahamoud Adam Bechir.24 Thus, for oil and mining companies, such a platform could help them to establish new legitimacy and credibility. In most EITI member countries, these companies a required to be a part of a tripartite arrangement in order to be at ease with the authorities. Moreover, the companies registered at the New York Stock exchange are obliged by the Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act of 2010 to disclose their payments related to exploration and production licenses’ acquisition. This law then rendered adherence to the EITI more or less inevitable. In Chad, Article 3 of Decree No. 874/PR/MSME/2014 states that ‘all oil, gas and mining, public and private companies, exploring or exploiting on the national territory are obliged to join and actively participate in EITI implementation’. Six company representatives are required to sit in the HCN (two from national companies, namely SHT25 and SOTEC26 and four from foreign companies, namely Esso and CNPC). The second vice president is also from one of these companies. In practice, companies are collaborating by providing data on their transactions and taking part in tripartite activities. In the meetings that we had the opportunity to attend, their presence was effective. Only SAS-Petroleum27 encountered difficulties in delivering data on its transactions for the 2012 report.28

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Klein (2012) found this to be the same motivation for Cameroon’s candidacy. http://www.rfi.fr/ameriques/20150701-etats-unis-deux-diplomates-tchadpoursuivis-corruption. 25 Société des Hydrocarbures du Tchad. 26 Société Tchadienne pour l’Exploitation des Carrières 27 The company is owned by Senator Ali Modu Sheriff, former governor and senator of Bornou State in northern Nigeria. 28 Interview with the former coordinator of the executive secretariat of EITI Chad, N’Djaména, 26 August 2014. 24

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have seriously damaged the resources necessary for the development of the country. That is why the fight against predators and corrupt officials will be strengthened more than ever. In addition to the State General Inspection, which is achieving a high-quality work, a court specially dedicated to economic crimes and corruption will be set up in the first quarter of 2017′.

role. Resulting from the obsession to include non state partners in the South, EITI sometimes leads to their neutralization as simple foils’ (p. 127–128). The involvement of Chad’s CSGs in the EITI was no doubt one of the key reasons why it achieved compliancy. Achieving this status, however, has crystallised all attention on these actors at the expense of any other debate. This has resulted in a kind of sacred union that nothing seemed able to disrupt. However, the question still remains whether conformity has become the main agenda of the CSGs’ commitment to EITI. In other words, CSGs, despite their commitment to the process, continue to remain intransigent on other shortcomings related to the extractive sector’s governance. This was also on the agenda of these organisations in Chad since the beginning of the oil project. In some cases, such a positioning cast doubt on the candidacy of their countries. In Chad, the partnership and the search at any cost of EITI compliance seem to have changed this situation. In Niger, during François Hollande’s visit (July, 2014), the Réseau des Organisations pour la Transparence et l’Analyse Budgétaire (ROTAB-Niger), although party to EITI Niger, demonstrated against AREVA’s attempt to renegotiate its contract with the state to its advantages. The leaders of this network have been arrested and released under the pressure of the International EITI Board.29 Afghan CSGs are also quoted as an example for blocking the country's accession to compliance for reasons relating to national circumstances, which in their view remain problematic.30 In the Democratic Republic of Congo, CSGs are also mentioned for their exemplary positioning within the EITI and their ability to keep a productive pressure for governance.31 These examples show that participating in the tripartite does not involve de facto an absolute need to ignore internal shortcomings related to extractive industries governance. In Chad, CSGs have become defenders of the country’s candidature to compliance at all costs. In 2012, this saved Chad’s candidacy when threatened with cancellation because of ‘luck of political will and uncertified data in the report’.32 So thanks to CSOs’ intervention, Chad could avoid his eviction from EITI in October 2012. CSOs sent a statement to require moratoria for the country. The expulsion of the Bishop of Doba worsened the situation’.33 The Bishop of Doba was based in the oil-producing area for decades and was therefore a daily witness to the entire Chad–Cameroon oil project’s implementation process. He has been declared persona non-grata and expelled immediately because he commented on oil resources governance in one of his Sunday talks. He was later reinstated, but this could amount to no doubt a handicap to the candidature of Chad to compliance. Civil society organisations’ advocacy saved the country as put by the former national coordinator. In other circumstances and contexts, certainly that compliance would not have been the only horizon of engagement by civil society. Corruption and governance challenges are recurrent issues in the public debate. In a redundant way, the highest authorities’ speech stresses the need to fight against this scourge. For more than a decade, ministerial departments and other institutions have been dedicated to its eradication: Ministry for Public Life Moralization, Ministry of Good Governance, Cobra Operation, State General Inspection, and the Court of Auditors. Some allegedly crooked officials were arrested, but it never went further. The situation is so alarming that in his inauguration after the last election (April 2016) speech, and in his address to the nation in December 2016, the President of the Republic stressed the need to take strong corrective measures: ‘We must recognize today that corruption and misappropriation of public funds

6. Institutional reforms? The shift in oil resource governance driven by the translation of EITI principles could also be observed through some institutional reforms in public services directly in charge of the management of the flow of petrodollars. Indeed, following the recommendations made by EITI reports, and in a bid to better control the flow of royalties and monitor oil revenues, a unit was established to permanently monitor the payments (Cellule de Collecte et de Centralisation des Recettes du Secteur Extractif) within the national treasury. This unit allows for easy access to information needed the preparation of EITI reports. Chad is seen as one country showing particular and productive leadership in the EITI implementation process. With the 2012 report, Chad became the first country to include in a report transit income (i.e. money paid to the State for the transport of crude oil through the Chad–Cameroon pipeline). It is also the first country to introduce transactions relating to a refinery. In the future, contracts with companies34 will no longer contain confidentiality stipulations. The EITI implementation process leaves room for bottom-up induced innovations by member countries. Chad has adapted, to a certain extent, the specificities of its extractive industries sector to be more comprehensive in its reports. The unit within the National Treasury is intended to correct the flaws of a system unable to provide real-time data on financial operations related to the extractive industries. Therefore, the process contributes to some extent to the production of reliable information on the flow of petrodollars. However, their fate from there and downstream transparency remains an issue. The translation of the EITI has led to a reconfiguration of the roles and repositioning of actors in relation to each other as well as a reorientation of the debates. This is, in our view, one of the major changes brought about by the EITI. 7. An unreachable debate? Non-state organisational representatives hitherto kept apart in terms of access to actual information on oil resources can now access and publish this information, owing to their participation in EITI. According to the EITI, the increased availability of information on financial flows from the extractive industries should enable citizens to hold their leaders more accountable and responsible. In accordance with this position, CSGs and their leaders are disseminating the contents of EITI reports at different levels through seminars, posters and radio spots, TV shows, and open doors days, hoping that people can use them to act. The result of such an approach remains unproven in a country where illiteracy is high and citizen momentums are most often treated as no less than destabilisation and public order disruption. Indeed, how could illiterate populations access and understand these colossal figures (i.e. 6.000.000.000.000 CFA)? This is practically not evident when we consider the fact that huge amounts such as this do not even have equivalences in most local languages apart from local Arabic.35 Moreover, the disclosure of figures on how much has been effectively paid and received by the State is not the most expected by the populations as granted by an expert of the national coordination: ‘In terms of communication, there is still a lot to be done mainly on the new standards. What is passed on as information is not always what

29 Interview with a programme manager working for a European NGO in Chad. N’Djaména, 28 August 2014. 30 Interview at EITI headquarters, in Oslo, 24 November 2014. 31 Interview at EITI headquarters, in Oslo, 24 November 2014. 32 Interview with a former civil society representative in the EITI, N’Djamena, 18 February 2016. 33 Interview with the head of the National Technical Secretary (STN), N’Djaména, 26 August 2014.

34 35

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Some are already accessible on EITI-Chad’s web site. Interview with linguists of SIL, N’Djaména, November 2015.

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partnerships with CSGs or civil society representatives within the EITI space. At the same time, ‘corruption practices and nepotism remain true cancers eating away the bones of Chad as a whole’ (Mbaihilameen, 2016).

people expected. People do not expect only the information on how many billions are received or paid but rather how there are concretely used’.36 The translation of EITI principles could barely reach the peripheral locations. Indeed, there are a multitude of CSGs in secondary cities such as Moundou, Doba and Sarh that have long worked on oil revenue governance. Even though they have been officially set, the regional committees are not functioning in an autonomous way. The translation seems to be focussed at the central level, and CSGs located in the provinces only receive reports and informative workshops. Despite the circulation of information on oil income flows at the national level, the oil-producing region's populations and local authorities (Logone Oriental) have no such visibility on the 5% of the oil revenues normally dedicated to the development of their region. One could therefore question the philosophy carried by the actors involved in this initiative. To inform people without making sure of the eventual use of the information passed on is far from leading to the expected change. Furthermore, the complexity of the debate underlined by the EITI and the high centralisation of the process in Chad limit its accessibility to transparency experts and specialists and other educated milieu and elites.

Acknowledgements We are grateful to Volkswagen Foundation for the funding, our advisor Dr Andrea Behrends, the Martin Luther University, Prof Reinwald (Hannover University) and her team and our colleagues from the Centre de Recherche en Anthropologie et Sciences Humaines (CRASH) in N’Djaména for their professional advice and administrative support. References Amar, et al., 2014. La société civile au Tchad. Cartographie des acteurs. Délégation de l’Union européenne au Tchad. COWI. Appel, Hannah, Arthur, Mason, Watts, Michael (Eds.), 2015. Subterranean Estates: Life Worlds of Oil and Gas. Cornell University Press, Ithaca. Auty, Richard M., 1993. Sustaining Development in Mineral Economies: The Resource Curse Thesis. Routledge, London. Behrends, Andrea, Hoinathy, Remadji, 2017. The devil’s money a multi-level approach to acceleration and turbulence in oil-producing Southern Chad. Soc. Anal. 61 (3), 56–72 Autumn. Behrends, Andrea, Reyna, Stephen P., Schlee, Günther, 2011. Crude domination: an anthropology of oil. Beghahn Books, New York. Travelling Models in African Conflict Management. Translating Technologies of Social Ordering. In: Behrends, Andrea, Park, Sung-Joon, Rottenburg, Richard (Eds.), Brill, Leiden. Behrends, Andrea, 2008. Fighting for oil when there is no oil yet: the darfur-Chad border. Eur. J. Anthropol. (52), 39–56. Bierschenk, Thomas, Chauveau, Jean-Pierre, Olivier de Sardan, Jean-Pierre, 2000. Les Courtiers entre Développement et État. Courtiers en développement: les villages africains en quête de projets. Karthala, Association euro-africaine pour l'anthropologie du changement social et du développement, Paris, Mainz, pp. 5–42. Blundo, Giorgio, 2002. « Editorial », Bulletin de l'APAD [En ligne]. pp. 23–24. mis en ligne le 17 février 2006, URL: http://apad.revues.org/129. Consulté le 21 avril 2014. Colom-Jaén, A., Campos-Serrano, A., 2013. Oil in Chad and Equatorial Guinea: Widening the Focus of the Resource Curse. Eur. J. Dev. Res. 25 (September (4)), 584–599. Fisher, William F., 1997. Doing good? The politics and antipolitics of NGO practices. Ann. Rev. Anthropol. 439–464. Foucault, Michel. 1994. "La gouvernementalité", in Dits et Écrits, édition établie sous la direction de Daniel Defert et François Ewald avec la collaboration de Jacques Lagrange, Paris, Gallimard, 4 vol., Texte n° 239, t. III : 635–657 ("Bibliothèque des sciences humaines"). Hoinathy, Remadji, 2013a. Fluch der guten Absicht. Weltsichten (July), 22–25. Hoinathy, Remadji, 2013b. Pétrole et changement social au Tchad Rente pétrolière et monétisation des relations économiques et sociales dans la zone pétrolière de Doba. Karthala, Paris. Hufty, Marc, 2007. La gouvernance est-elle un concept opérationnel? Fédéralisme Régionalisme [En ligne], Numéro 2—Société civile, globalisation, gouvernance: aux origines d’un nouvel ordre politique? Volume 7 (URL:). http://popups.ulg.ac.be/ 1374-3864/index.php?id=635. Junge, Benjamin, 2012. NGOs as shadow pseudopublics: grassroots community leaders’ perceptions of change and continuity in Porto Alegre, Brazil. Am. Ethnol. 39 (2), 407–424. Karl, Terry Lynn, 1997. The Paradox of Plenty: Oil Booms and Petro-states. Berkeley. University of California Press. Keenan, Jeremy H., 2005. Chad-Cameroon oil pipeline: world bank and ExxonMobil in ‘Last chance saloon’. Rev. African Polit. Econ. 105 (104/105), 395–405. Klein, Asmara., 2012. La transparence au Sud: l’opportunité de s’autonomiser pour la société civile locale? L’exemple de la campagne transnationale Publiez ce que vous payez. Perspect. Int. (Janvier (1)), 108–131. Le Meur, Pierre Yves, 1996. Les Courtiers Locaux du Développement: Synthèse. Bulletin de l'APAD (14.02.2013), [En ligne]. Magrin, Géraud, 2013. Voyage en Afrique rentière. Une lecture géographique des trajectoires du développement. Publications de la Sorbonne, coll. Territoires en mouvements. Mbaihilameen, Cephas, 2016. Comment la rente pétrolière peut-elle contribuer à la soutenabilité de l’économie tchadienne? dernier accès, le 29.02.16. http://www. croset-td.org/2016/01/comment-la-rente-petroliere-peut-elle-contribuer-a-lasoutenabilite-de-leconomie-tchadienne/. Miandadji, Eloi, 2014a. Entretien avec Dr Gilbert Maoundonodji, Vice-président du Haut Comité National d’ITIE-TCHAD. Initiative pour la Transparence dans les industries Extractives au Tchad. pp. pp. 25–27 Edition Spéciale aout 2014. Le Tchad à la 6ème Conférence de l’ITIE à Sydney. Initiative pour la Transparence dans les industries Extractives au Tchad. pp. p. 16 Edition Spéciale aout 2014. David, Mosse, 2005. Global Governance and the Ethnography of International Aid. In: Mosse, D., Lewis, D. (Eds.), The Aid Effect. Giving and Governing in International Development. Pluto Press, London, pp. 1–36.

8. Conclusion: the rule of experts From what precedes, there are reasons to fear that ‘the governance market may also just benefit groups that can optimally interact with national and international policy makers, and new “governance brokers” may then appear’ (Blundo 2002: 3). Non-state actors here seem entrapped in this shared commitment, which puts them in the same locomotive with the State and chases away any serious attempt for divergence even if it is necessary. To summarise, the interactions of non-state actors and the Chadian Government with regard to oil governance shifted from antagonism to a degree of complementarity in the implementation of the EITI but could eventually turn to a simple juxtaposition (after Blundo, 2002). By observing the process of implementing the EITI in Chad and the involvement of CSG representatives, one could also observe that the term ‘civil society’ should here be carefully used. In fact, the debate is situated at a level where the people acting as civil society representatives or community leaders can do so only owing to their personal expertise and knowledge of the matters in discussion. Therefore, most of these actors monopolise the debate on behalf of the great number without always considering their real needs and aspirations. The implementation of the EITI opened new spaces for CSG experts in transparency, skilfully playing their own agenda behind their social engagement. We cannot also rule out the fact that for these representatives, participating in the EITI on behalf of their organisation or on behalf of civil society, is quite an appealing deal. First, they could easily join the global network on transparency, travel worldwide and access decision-makers. This creates a gap between them and the communities they are supposed to represent. Over the long term, this could raise legitimacy questions. Second, material considerations are part of the deal. The members of the National High Committee receive quarterly consequent indemnities.37 In the field, the gap between the intention and the real yield of the EITI on governance is very sizable. The outcome of the EITI on corruption and poverty or widely on the resource curse seems very meagre. The winners of the game remain oil companies and the State. The former are permitted to conducting their business at ease without being obliged to pay more pot de vin than necessary, seen as all the payments should be declared. The State could join the club of transparent oil states and access HIPC and other facilities because of its compliance to EITI. Furthermore, the oil business could go on with ease, owing to new 36 37

Interview N’Djamena, 26 November 2015. Ca 500.000 F CFA (ca. 763 Euro).

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Mross, Karina, 2012. Fighting the Curse by Lifting the Curtain. How Effective Is Transparency as an Instrument to Escape the Resource Trap? Tectum Verlag. Neubert, D., 1996. The role of local brokers in the development system. Experiences with self-help projects in East Africa. Bulletin de Lyapa 11. [on line]. http://apad.revues. org/731. Olivier de Sardan, J.-P., 2009. Les huit modes de gouvernance locale en Afrique de l’Ouest. Etudes et Travaux n° 79. Reyna, Stephen, 2007. The traveling model that would not travel: oil, empire, and patrimonialism in contemporary Chad. Soc. Anal. 51 (3), 02–781. Merry, Sally Engle, 2006. Transnational human rights and local activism: mapping the middle. Am. Anthropol. 1 (1), 38–51.

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