Vertical integration in the post-IFQ halibut fishery

Vertical integration in the post-IFQ halibut fishery

ARTICLE IN PRESS Marine Policy 30 (2006) 341–346 Vertical integration in the post-IFQ halibut fishery Robert Dawson D...

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Marine Policy 30 (2006) 341–346

Vertical integration in the post-IFQ halibut fishery Robert Dawson Departments of Economics and Environmental Studies, Washington College, Chestertown, MD 21620, USA Received 18 January 2005; accepted 1 April 2005

Abstract In some fisheries, claims have been made that quota programs have led to increased vertical integration, with processors controlling quota and fishermen. In the US halibut fishery a quota program was designed specifically to maintain the small-scale vessel nature of the fishery. This paper reports on what changes have been seen in the vertical structure of the halibut fishery and offers some explanation for these changes. Results indicate that the specific rights granted can have significantly different effects on the vertical structure of the industry. In the case of the halibut fishery vertical integration was avoided and market transactions actually increased. r 2005 Elsevier Ltd. All rights reserved. Keywords: Fisheries management; Industry structure; Vertical integration

1. Introduction The history of the US halibut fishery is well known. Due to increasing effort, fishing was restricted through the use of seasonal limitations, gear restrictions, and an annual total allowable catch. From 1977 to 1994 halibut catch in the central Gulf of Alaska tripled, while allowed fishing days dropped from 47 to just two or three 24-h periods per year [1]. The fishery had become a classic derby fishery. In response to the drastically reduced fishing season and over-capitalization, an individual fishing quota (IFQ) program was instituted in 1995 for the Pacific halibut fishery. One of the particular policy objectives in this management plan was to ‘‘forestall a full scale reorganization of the fleet which might result in larger vessels dominating quota at the expense of smaller vesselsy’’ [2]. In the words of the proposed rule, the program was designed to ‘‘assure that IFQs remain in the hands of fishermen who have a history of past participation and current dependence on the fishery’’ (57 FR 57130). To attain this goal, two restrictions on the trading and Tel.: +1 410 778 7858; fax: +1 410 810 7132.

E-mail address: [email protected] 0308-597X/$ - see front matter r 2005 Elsevier Ltd. All rights reserved. doi:10.1016/j.marpol.2005.04.001

ownership of quota were used. The first divides catcher vessels into three different size classes and prohibits larger vessels from buying quota from smaller vessels. The second institutes a so-called ‘‘owner-operator’’ or ‘‘owner onboard’’ requirement for second-generation quota shares. Taken together, these two regulations also help to ward off increased vertical integration, where processors come to own and control the use of quota. After the 1990 implementation of an individual transferable quota system in the Mid-Atlantic surf clam and ocean quahog fishery, quota moved from the hands of the fishermen to the processors (and even banks). Some people within the fishery view this vertical integration as a failure of the system and have encouraged regulators—Congress and the regional Councils—to ensure that this does not happen again [3]. And, according to Tietenberg [4], market structure and vertical integration were two of the issues the Ocean Studies Board’s Committee to Review Individual Fishing Quotas was charged with investigating . However, their task was monumental and vertical integration received little to no attention in their final report Sharing the Fish: Toward a National Policy on Individual Fishing Quota.


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In an effort to fill this gap, this paper assesses the effects of the restrictions in the halibut program on the vertical structure of the fishery. Outright purchase of quota by processors, changes in contracting and bargaining power, and changes in spot markets since the inception of the program all shed light on the question. The effects of these rules also provide insight into more recent and upcoming fisheries regulations.

2. The Halibut Quota Program The basic structure of the halibut program is like those seen elsewhere. A fisherman’s share of the fishery is determined by his or her ‘‘quota share’’ (QS) that specifies what percentage of the yearly total allowable catch the holder has rights to. At the beginning of each season, this share is calculated in pounds and each QS holder is allocated their share of individual fishing quota pounds (IFQ lbs). As is stated above, however, the halibut quota program is different from the standard individual transferable quota program in its restrictions on the transfer of quota. The first restriction is a restraint on the size class of the vessel on which the IFQ lbs are being fished. QS and IFQ lbs are divided into 3 different classes based on the type and size of vessel and a fourth based on processing activity. Anyone wishing to process at sea must hold ‘‘A’’ shares, though there is no requirement that fish harvested under A shares actually be processed at sea. That is, anyone can use A shares, but if a processor wants to process at sea, they must use A shares. A shares are oftentimes referred to as ‘‘freezer shares.’’ Shares for the three different size classes of catcher vessels are ‘‘B’’ for vessels greater than 65 ft long, ‘‘C’’ for vessels 36–65 ft long; and ‘‘D’’ for vessels less than 35 ft long. Aside from the need to hold A shares to process at sea, thereby restricting transfers, anyone with a B length vessel may only fish B shares and a fisherman with a C length vessel may only fish B or C shares. Owners of D length vessels may fish B, C or D shares, so-called ‘‘fishing down.’’ The second restriction requires that once B, C or D shares (catcher vessel QS) are transferred, becoming second-generation quota, the new owner must be on-board the vessel fishing that quota. The only exception to this owner-on-board provision is for partnerships, corporations, and other business forms where it is either not possible or is impractical to have the owner of the QS on-board the CV. For such recipients of an initial catcher vessel quota allocation, it is permitted to have a hired master operate the vessel, provided that the vessel is owned by the quota holder. Therefore the restriction applies to (i) anyone who did not receive an initial allocation of catcher vessel QS, and (ii) anyone not owning the vessel on which the QS will be fished.

3. Vertical structure post-IFQs There is little literature on vertical integration in commercial fisheries (see [5,6]) on which to base any model of the vertical structure of this fishery. Further, empirical analysis is hampered by a lack of data and any tried-and-true way to measure the degree of vertical coordination in an industry. Thus a case study of the halibut fishery is presented. It follows in three sections, each dealing with one type or level of vertical coordination. The first section is the outright purchase of QS and quota pounds by processors, the second deals with the state of contracting and bargaining within the fishery, and the final section analyzes spot market transactions. 3.1. Vertical integration To determine how much quota has been sold to processors is difficult because there are many different classifications of potential buyers and the potential buyers themselves chose these classifications when they apply for their license to purchase quota. These classifications include Catcher–Processor (CP), Broker, Catcher–Seller (CS), Mothership (MS), Retail, Restaurant, Shoreplant, Tender, and Other. While the classifications may seem self-explanatory, some clarification is in order. While one might normally think of a CP vessel as a vessel from which fish is caught and then processed and packaged on board (a freezer vessel), oftentimes in this fishery if any processing at all is done on-board the vessel is classified as a CP. This includes something as common as head-and-gut processing.1 A Broker is a broker in quota, not fish. Catcher–Seller refers to those fishermen who sell their catch at the dockside to passersby or at a market. They are typically small-scale fishermen. An MS is a vessel that does not harvest any of its own catch, but that takes catch from other vessels and then processes that catch on board. Retail is the classification for a retail store (as opposed to CS). Restaurant is surely self-explanatory, as is Shoreplant. A Tender is someone who unloads a catcher vessel (and pays for the catch) and then turns around and sells the catch to a shoreplant or some other buyer. Finally, the ‘‘Other’’ classification is for anyone that feels they do not fit in any of these categories. Because each of these ‘‘types’’ is legally able to buy quota, it was necessary to examine all sales of quota since the inception of the program. Data was acquired 1 According to Jessica Gherrit of the NMFS Restricted Access Management office in Juneau, Alaska, there may have been confusion among fishermen as to what classification to choose because of a related state law. Therefore, fishermen who, under Alaska state law are considered Catcher-Processors, may not necessarily be considered a CP according to federal law, yet, to avoid problems they self-described as such.

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from the Restricted Access Management (RAM) division of the National Marine Fisheries Service (NMFS) Juneau office, which administers the program. For the purpose of this study, it is assumed that any fish caught under a freezer, or A, share is also processed at sea (de facto vertical integration) and so any trades within this category are ignored. The remaining data were sorted by the type of buyer involved in each transaction. Since this program was designed to maintain the small-scale nature of the fishery, and the aim of this research is to evaluate changes in the vertical structure of the fishery, it was necessary to evaluate each trade to see exactly what sort of buyer is involved. Because of the rather confusing classifications of registered buyers, two different data sets were created from the overall set of trades. The first data set used a very broad definition of which buyers were truly processors. Any registered buyer listed as a CP, Shoreplant, or Mothership for any year, no matter if other classifications were also chosen, was identified as a processor. This likely represents an upper bound on the quota sales from fishermen to true processors. Conversely, an alternative definition was used that classified a buyer as a processor only if the chosen definitions were CP, Mothership, or Shoreplant for all years in the data set. Using this more conservative definition will likely yield a lower bound on the quota sales from fishermen to processors. The results of this analysis are presented in Table 1. For the years 1995–2001, the table shows 3 different statistics. The first for each year, for QS and IFQ, and for both upper and lower bounds, is simply the number of units that were traded from a harvester to a processor. Second is what percent of total trades those vertically integrated trades represent for the year. Finally, for QS only, total trades for the year is added to the total allocation of A shares for the year and this is divided by the total allocation to all classes to determine what percent of the fishery was vertically integrated in each year. For the years 1996 and on, the measure is cumulative. That is, the previous years’ trades are included in order to see how vertical integration has changed over time. At the onset of the program, assumed vertical integration at the upper bound started at 2.60%, and at the lower bound was 1.58%.2 Table 1 shows that for an upper bound, all trades of catcher vessel QS resulting in increased vertical integration by approximately 1.68 percentage points, up to 4.28%. The lower bound shows an increase of one half-percentage point, up to 2.04% vertical integration. More importantly, however, because freezer shares can actually be held by anyone, it is 2 Initial vertical integration was calculated by sorting the initial issuance of QS by the same method used for sorting later trades. Because new allocations were made up until 2000, that year’s final allocation was used at the total.


possible to have these shares traded away from processors to independent fishermen. That is, integration of B, C, and D shares may be offset by sales of A shares to independent fishermen. A similar analysis of IFQ lbs trades shows what can be thought of as a temporary increase in vertical integration since IFQ lbs sales are only valid for the year. These trades show an upper bound range of 0.9–2.9% and a lower bound range of 0.0–1.6% of IFQ lbs being vertically integrated in any 1 year. What is curious about this is that as processors consolidate QS and IFQ on their vessels, they could buy additional vessels and continue buying quota. The owner on board requirement of second-generation catcher vessel quota does not apply to those processing companies that received initial allocations. If the processor were to buy a new vessel, the processor would be within their rights to buy quota and hire a master to fish from that new vessel. Much was made of processors owning quota in the surf clam and ocean quahog fishery in the eastern US that led, in part, to the Congressional moratorium on quota programs. Yet this has not happened to any great degree in the halibut; at most vertical integration of quota increased by just over one and a half percentage points. Related to this is the restriction on transfers between size classes. As originally written, shares could only be traded within their size class. At the behest of the harvesters, this was changed in 1998 so that smaller vessels were allowed to buy quota from larger vessels. The question was, since the intent of the program is to maintain the small-scale characteristic of the fishery, why not let smaller vessels buy QS and IFQ from larger vessels? In terms of maintaining a small-scale fishing fleet, two advantages come from allowing fishing down but not allowing the opposite. The first is that the smaller vessels remain and have a larger pool of quota to buy from if the need or desire arises. But, secondly, if there is to be any new entry of actual vessels, it encourages entry into the smaller categories, for the same reason above—there is potentially more quota available. 3.2. Contracting Conclusions regarding contracting stem from the overwhelming evidence that under both the US IFQ and Canadian IVQ programs bargaining power has shifted from the processing sector to the harvesting sector. It is important to remember the enormous changes in the fishery pre- and post-IFQ in order to understand this shift in power. Prior to quota management the halibut fishery was a classic derby-style fishery with harvesters racing to catch fish within only two or three 24 h periods. The fleet was so large and so effective at catching fish that this was all the longer it took to harvest the entire year’s allowable catch. Because this

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Table 1 Trades of halibut QS and IFQ lbs from fishermen to processors Year

Upper bound

Lower bound


IFQ lbs


IFQ lbs


Trades % for year Cumulative integration (%)

1,102,322 2.13 2.94

111,593 2.23

778,712 1.51 1.81

77,644 1.55


Trades % for year Cumulative integration (%)

1,264,441 2.49 3.32

115,580 2.87

85,651 0.17 1.84

3582 0.09


Trades % for year Cumulative integration (%)

643,238 1.55 3.51

85,759 1.70

399,164 0.96 1.96

53,999 1.07


Trades % for year Cumulative integration (%)

259,579 1.13 3.59

39,669 1.33

16,717 0.07 1.96

2947 0.10


Trades % for year Cumulative integration (%)

434,101 1.26 3.72

44,141 1.01

103.681 0.30 2.00

16,005 0.37


Trades % for year Cumulative integration (%)

797,313 2.94 3.96

40,052 0.89

165,246 0.61 2.04

0 0.00


Trades % for year Cumulative integration (%)

1,069,905 3.73 4.28

132,773 2.75

0 0.00 2.04

0 0.00

Source: NMFS.

amount of fish was caught in such a short period of time, much of it was frozen. Since quota management began, however, the season has stretched to 8 months. This allowed the market to change from a primarily frozen-fish market to primarily fresh. Prior to the IFQ program, approximately 17% of halibut was processed fresh, while post-IFQ that number has jumped to 59%. The shift from a primarily frozen fish fishery to a fresh market allowed the entry of new processors as well. The need for freezing capacity was a barrier to entry, and without that barrier the processing sector saw a change in structure. According to the US General Accounting Office [7], between 1995 and 2001, 68 halibut processors exited the market while another 56 relatively small processors (less than 100,000 lbs of halibut processed in a year) entered.3 This entry was by both processing plants and broker/ reprocessors, which Matulich [8] describes as being ‘‘analogous to an auctioneerymaximiz[ing] revenue to 3

The GAO notes that not all exit was due to changes in the halibut fishery. ‘‘For example, one processor with a freezing operation bought halibut, but its primary business was buying salmonyWhen the supply of farmed salmon increased, contributing to price decreases, the owner decided to sell the plant.’’ Others closed because of ‘‘poor business decisions unrelated to the IFQ program,’’ another’s plant burned down, and still others closed because of ‘‘personal reasons’’ ([7], p. 6).

the quota holder by leveraging excess capacity among processors, given wholesale demand at any particular point in time.’’ While brokers/reprocessors do have vertical ties to harvesters, they are limited to specifying quantity, date of delivery, and location of delivery. Regarding other entry into the processing sector, actual entry by primary processors was minimal and some of the entry of new processors was actually harvesters becoming processors themselves [8]. As the primary product shifted from frozen to fresh halibut and new processors entered the market, wholesale prices rose 66%.4 According to Matulich, even given the increase in the value of halibut, 100% of the benefit went to harvesters. That fishermen benefited from this, rather than processors, shows that bargaining power must have shifted. And proof that these changes led to greater bargaining power for the fishermen comes straight from the mouths of the processors.5 4 According to Matulich ([9], pp. 37–39) the ‘‘average wholesale price for traditional processed halibut’’ in 1992–1993 was $1.82/lbs. Of this, $1.11/lbs was due to ex-vessel cost. In 1999–2000 this increased to $3.01/lbs, with $2.29/lbs being ex-vessel cost. For custom processing in 2000, average wholesale price was $3.07/lbs. and $2.23/lb was ex-vessel cost. 5 Processors, of course, would have something to gain in future programs if they can show that under this IFQ program they were harmed. This is discussed below.

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Processors have expressed their dissatisfaction with the program. In 2002 Congressional testimony, Ralph Hoard of Icicle Seafoods [10] stated that while Icicle was in favor of rationalization of fisheries, they do have complaints about how the halibut program was structured. These complaints are related to their large investment in freezing capacity made in the late 1970s when the derby fishery developed. As the season grew shorter and shorter, additional freezer capacity was needed. As Hoard says, oftentimes there would be ‘‘3 to 4 million pounds of halibut waiting to be delivered’’ at once. With rationalization, Hoard continues, ‘‘The quality of fish being delivered is far superior to the pre-IFQ fishery. The added value of the catch in the market is a lot higher. Unfortunately, 100% of that value has gone to the harvesting sector’’ (emphasis added). He continues, ‘‘Our profit margin on halibut and sablefish during the first 6 years of the IFQ program is $20,000,000 less than it was the 6 years previous to the program.’’ Supporting this is Knapp’s 1997 ‘‘Initial Effects of the Alaska Halibut IFQ Program: Survey Comments of Alaskan Fishermen.’’ This survey of 300 fishermen elicited the following comments (among others) regarding prices in the market: ‘‘Better quality product—better price;’’ ‘‘Price is usually higher. The halibut derby flooded the market and quality was down. We can now compete with Canadians for fresh fish market throughout season;’ and, ‘‘Seems to be more competitive among buyers for product—translates into higher price for product’’ ([11], p. 247). This last comment is particularly telling. Now that the larger market for fresh halibut can be exploited, processors must compete more intensely among themselves. This leads to more bargaining power for the harvesters and thus higher prices. Where once halibut fishermen had little bargaining power, Matulich has stated in personal communication, that bargaining power has shifted so drastically that fishermen are able to ask for higher prices upon delivery, and if their demands are not met, freely leave to find a different buyer who will meet their price. The British Columbia halibut fishery has seen the same result since the 1991 introduction of individual vessel quota (IVQ) management.6 Casey et al. [12] report that, in the BC fishery, ex-vessel prices have increased. The authors explicitly point out that in the BC fishery, like the Alaskan fishery, there has been entry by smaller, more specialized, processors. Because there is no longer the need for massive freezing capacity, entry costs are much lower. This entry into the processing sector has brought on more competition for the input. This is interesting to contrast with Love et al.’s pre-IFQ 6 The Canadian halibut IVQ program runs much like the US IFQ program. The difference is that quota is actually associated with a particular vessel, and consolidation of quota is limited to 1% of the overall quota per vessel.


result that ‘‘season duration and processor market power exertion at the vessel level is evident’’ [13, p. 250]. This led to rent being captured by the processing sector during derby-style fishing. Since the rationalization of these fisheries, however, that distribution of rent has shifted to the harvesting sector. 3.3. Spot market transactions One further development in the processing sector that deserves discussion is the development of a new auction system for fresh halibut. The Auction Block, as it is called, was developed after the institution of the IFQ system. It takes advantage of the combination of fresh product and the ports along the Alaskan road system. A fee is charged for the auction service and, if harvesters desire, boats can be off-loaded, the fish packed on ice, and trucks loaded for a further fee. An auction is, of course, the antithesis of vertical coordination. While the Auction Block is not extensive since few ports are actually located along the road system, one result of the IFQ program has been the development of an institution where there are no vertical ties.

4. Changes in vertical structure Whether or not there has been a change in the level of vertical coordination can be answered in two parts. Prior to IFQ management, harvesters and processors necessarily had some vertical ties. Matulich [8] states that even though it was possible for a harvester to deliver to a different processor, ‘‘capacity restrictions tended to result in the formation of ‘‘traditional’’ delivery patterns’’. Dave Fraser, a long-time participant in the North Pacific fisheries, puts it another way, somewhat deflating the idea that there were formal ties. He says, ‘‘To the degree that prices tended to be similar between plants in a given town, boats went to processors to whom they had ties for other species (i.e. salmon markets)’’ [14]. When there were no such ties, he continues, they simply went to the processor with the shortest line. Since IFQ management, however, it is clear that harvesters are able to move amongst processors to a greater degree. The second development of note is the establishment of the Auction Block. Prior to IFQ management, a dock-side auction system like this was impossible. The lengthening of the halibut season, the ensuing shift to a primarily fresh market, and the effects this had on the processing sector have clearly led to the weakened vertical ties in this fishery. Excess freezing capacity, ease of entry, and the institution of a new spotmarket have all given harvesters more choices and more power. Policy makers can look at the halibut IFQ program as a model of how to design a quota program


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that avoids increased vertical integration and even improves the standing of the harvesting sector. But while the halibut IFQ program was successful in maintaining the small-scale nature of the fishery, it has had the side effect of causing a not insignificant change in the processing sector. Bargaining power shifted away from processors to the harvesting sector and processors have seen profits decrease. The natural reaction to this would have been for the processors to vertically integrate thereby lowering costs and guaranteeing the availability of input. Those processors that owned and operated catcher vessels prior to the program and who were allocated initial catcher vessel quota could have purchased more quota, yet this did not happen.

5. Effect on future fishery management plans The question then becomes: Was subsequent management affected by this? The American Fisheries Act structured the North Pacific pollock fishery as processor cooperatives. Harvesters are specifically associated with a particular processor, thereby creating de facto vertical integration. But according to Brent Paine, Executive Director of United Catcher Boats, the pollock fishery was highly vertically coordinated before the AFA was enacted [15]. Further, the North Pacific Fisheries Management Council noted in 1995 that increasing vertical coordination was quite possibly an inevitable outcome of ‘‘a maturing pollock fishery’’ ([16, Appendix 2 p. 66] ; see also [17]). To exactly what degree the inevitable vertical coordination in the pollock fishery versus a desire to avoid the outcome of the halibut fishery influenced the design of the pollock program is difficult to determine. However, it is easy to see that the processing sector was not happy with their fortunes in the halibut fishery and had no desire to see that repeated. Thus a system of processor cooperatives guarantees processors their same ability to process. However, there is good reason to believe that the processors in the pollock fishery would have maintained their positions because there are so few pollock processors in this fishery and there was already a high level of vertical integration. Further, pollock is processed differently from halibut. There is no market for fresh pollock, thus no fresh market could emerge from any extension in the season. The Bering Sea and Aleutian Islands crab fisheries are the latest to see rationalization. The proposed rule for the quota system governing that fishery was published on 29 October 2004 (69 FR 63200) specifying a ‘‘two pie’’ program with one set of quota for harvesters and another for processors (see [18]). Restrictions on processors owning harvester QS are perhaps even more restrictive, requiring a corporation or partnership to own at least 20% by a US citizen with at least 150 days

of experience at sea. Interestingly, processor quota can be held by anyone. Looking into the future, the Pacific Fishery Management Council is in the process of developing a rationalization plan for their groundfish fishery. Whatever form it does take, again, it is not hard to imagine that the experiences of the halibut fishery will influence its final form as has undoubtedly happened in the North Pacific pollock and crab fisheries. References [1] Ocean Studies Board, Commission on Geosciences, Environment, and Resources, National Research Council. Sharing the fish: toward a national policy on individual fishing quotas. Washington, DC: National Academy Press; 1999. [2] Pautzke C, Oliver C. Development of the individual fishing quota program for sablefish and halibut longline fisheries off Alaska. Presented, September 4th to the National Research Council’s Committee to Review Individual Fishing Quotas. Anchorage, AK: 1997. [3] O’Malley. Comments made before the Ocean Studies Board of the National Academy of Sciences. Boston, MA: May 7, 1998. [4] Tietenberg, T. Personal communication via e-mail. April 7, 1998. [5] Gallick E. Exclusive dealing and vertical integration: the efficiency of contracts in the Tuna industry. In: Masten S, editor. Case studies in contracting and organization. New York: Oxford University Press; 1996. p. 203–23. [6] Koss P. Self-enforcing transactions: reciprocal exposure in fisheries. Journal of Law, Economics, and Organization 1999;15(3):737–49. [7] US General Accounting Office. Individual Fishing Quotas: Economic Effects on Processors and Methods Available to Protect Communities. Publication #GAO-04-487T. Washington, DC: US GAO; 2004. [8] Matulich SC. Personal communication via e-mail, July 31 and August 4, 2003. [9] Matulich SC. Testimony before Subcommittee on Fisheries Conservation, Wildlife, and Oceans, Committee on Resources, United States House of Representatives, Hearing on Individual Fishing Quotas. February 13, 2002. [10] Hoard R. Testimony before Subcommittee on Fisheries Conservation, Wildlife, and Oceans, Committee on Resources, United States House of Representatives, Hearing on Individual Fishing Quotas. February 13, 2002. [11] Knapp G. Initial effects of the Alaska halibut IFQ program: survey comments of Alaska fishermen. Marine Resource Economics 1997;12:239–48. [12] Casey K, Dewees C, Turris B, Wilen J. The effects of individual vessel quotas in the British Columbia halibut fishery. Marine Resource Economics 1995;10:211–30. [13] Love H, Burton D, Silva G, Lei S. Regulatory controls and market power exertion: a study of the Pacific halibut industry. Natural Resource Modeling 1995;9(3):229–53. [14] Fraser D. Personal communication via e-mail, November 11 2004. [15] Paine B. Personal interview, November 22, 2000. [16] North Pacific Fishery Management Council. Development of the Individual Fishing Quota Program for Sablefish and halibut Longline Fisheries off Alaska. Anchorage: North Pacific Fishery Management Council; 1997. [17] North Pacific Fishery Management Council. Social Impact Assessment for Inshore/Offshore 3. Achorage: North Pacific Fishery Management Council; 1998. [18] Fina M. Rationalization of the Bering Sea and Aleutian Islands crab fisheries. Marine Policy 2005;29(4):311–22.